The relationship between productive efficiency and sustainable development of fishing industries in developing countries has received little attention. Ill-structured property rights in common-pool resources lead to a contradiction between private and social technical efficiency, with private and social costs dependent on the level of technical efficiency. Development policies that increase private efficiency can increase the social cost with ill-structured property rights and common-pool resources, and thereby increase social inefficiency. This paper examines this relationship through a case study of the mini purse seine fishery of the Java Sea, and finds that private technical efficiency does not depend on any measurable attributes of human capital, diverges substantially between the peak and off seasons, and differs between vessels more within the off season.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Volume (Year): 10 (2005) Issue (Month): 06 (December) Pages: 837-859 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF