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Lost Opportunities for Compromise in the Bank War: A Reassessment of Jackson's Veto Message

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  • Perkins, Edwin J.

Abstract

In this article Professor Perkins reexamines President Andrew Jackson's objections to the bill to recharter the Second Bank of the United States, as expressed in his famous veto message of 1832. He observes that, in addition to its exaggerated rhetoric, the veto message discusses at length a number of alleged deficiencies in the existing charter provisions. Professor Perkins's systematic analysis of the probable ramifications of a series of judicious alterations reveals that a compromise bill reformulated to meet most of the president's stated objections would not have seriously undermined the institution's position in American financial markets. Although several opportunities for sensible compromise arose, Nicholas Biddle and other members of the probank faction disregarded them. Perkins argues that the failure of bank supporters to consider comparatively modest modifications in the terms of recharter was a major blunder that ultimately doomed the Second Bank.

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  • Perkins, Edwin J., 1987. "Lost Opportunities for Compromise in the Bank War: A Reassessment of Jackson's Veto Message," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 531-550, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:buhirw:v:61:y:1987:i:04:p:531-550_04
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    Cited by:

    1. Calomiris, Charles W. (Каломирис, Чарльз) & Haber, Stephen H. (Хабер, Стивен Х.), 2016. "Fragile by design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit [Непрочные По Конструкции: Политические Причины Банковских Кризисов И Дефицита Кредитов]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 7-34, August.

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