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Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

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  • Hollyer, James R.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter
  • Vreeland, James Raymond

Abstract

Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Hollyer, James R. & Rosendorff, B. Peter & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2019. "Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 1251-1277, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:49:y:2019:i:04:p:1251-1277_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Boese, Vanessa A. & Edgell, Amanda B. & Hellmeier, Sebastian & Maerz, Seraphine F. & Lindberg, Staffan I., 2021. "How democracies prevail: democratic resilience as a two-stage process," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 28(5), pages 885-907.

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