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Rationality and Rationalistic Choice in the California Recall

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  • Michael Alvarez, R.
  • Roderick Kiewiet, D.

Abstract

The California recall election of 2003 provides an excellent setting for investigating voter rationality and certain forms of sophisticated voting. In a pre-election telephone survey, 1,500 registered voters were asked to make pairwise comparisons between the major candidates, and their responses were combined to infer preferences. Individuals’ preference orderings over the major candidates rarely exhibited intransitivity. The patterns of tactical voting observed in the replacement part of the recall election were consistent with the declining rate hypothesis. Voters also engaged in ‘hedge voting’ on the recall question itself. The results suggest that voters’ decisions are ‘rationalistic’: while voters are consistent in forming utility-based preference rankings and choosing on that basis, their voting strategies do not incorporate probability assessments in a realistic, consistent fashion, if at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Alvarez, R. & Roderick Kiewiet, D., 2009. "Rationality and Rationalistic Choice in the California Recall," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 267-290, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:39:y:2009:i:02:p:267-290_00
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    Cited by:

    1. George Tridimas, 2016. "Conflict, democracy and voter choice: a public choice analysis of the Athenian ostracism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 137-159, October.
    2. Marcelo Tyszler & Arthur Schram, 2016. "Information and strategic voting," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 360-381, June.

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