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Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy

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  • BINGHAM POWELL JR, G.
  • VANBERG, GEORG S.

Abstract

Comparative studies of election rules and legislative representation have focused intensively on vote–seat disproportionality as an indication of poor representation. Beginning with citizens' preferences, rather than votes, has important advantages and is especially more appropriate for a majoritarian vision of democracy. We analyse the effect of election rules on both vote–seat correspondence and median left–right correspondence in seventy elections in seventeen countries. We show theoretically the stringent conditions necessary to reduce vote–seat disproportionality in high threshold systems and empirically their high variance (and higher levels) of distortion. Although good median correspondence could be created, in theory, under a wide range of electoral systems, our empirical results suggest that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to outperform single-member district (SMD) systems by this criterion also.

Suggested Citation

  • Bingham Powell Jr, G. & Vanberg, Georg S., 2000. "Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 383-411, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:30:y:2000:i:03:p:383-411_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Rosaria Alfano & Anna Laura Baraldi & Erasmo Papagni, 2016. "Effect of the proportionality degree of electoral systems on corruption," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 34(8), pages 1895-1916, December.
    2. Carina Bischoff, 2013. "Electorally unstable by supply or demand?—an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 537-561, September.
    3. Raffaella Santolini, 2017. "Electoral Rules And Public Spending Composition: The Case Of Italian Regions," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 551-577, July.
    4. Aaron Brick & Cameron Brick, 2021. "Districting that minimizes partisan bias," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-6, December.
    5. Maria Rosaria Alfano & Anna Laura Baraldi, 2015. "The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: an extension," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 4(1), pages 5-24, June.
    6. Alfano, Maria Rosaria & Baraldi, Anna Laura & Papagni, Erasmo, 2014. "Electoral Systems and Corruption: the Effect of the Proportionality Degree," MPRA Paper 53138, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Nov 2013.
    7. J. Ryan Lamare & John W. Budd, 2022. "The relative importance of industrial relations ideas in politics: A quantitative analysis of political party manifestos across 54 countries," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 22-49, January.
    8. Alice Guerra & Mogens K. Justesen, 2022. "Vote buying and redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 315-344, December.
    9. Raffaella SANTOLINI, 2013. "Electoral rules and public expenditure composition: Evidence from Italian regions," Working Papers 396, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    10. M. Rosaria Alfano & A. Laura Baraldi, 2014. "Electoral Systems and Economic Growth: What is the Importance of the Proportionality Degree?," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2014/06, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    11. Indridi H Indridason, 2013. "Expressive motives and third-party candidates," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 182-213, April.
    12. John Carey & Simon Hix, 2013. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 139-148, January.

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