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Linear Versus Nonlinear Allocation Rules In Risk Sharing Under Financial Fairness

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  • Schumacher, Johannes M.

Abstract

In a risk exchange, participants trade a privately owned risk for a share in a pool. If participants agree on a valuation rule, it can be decided whether or not, according to the given rule, these trades take place at equal value. If equality of values holds for all participants, then the exchange is said to be “financially fair†. It has been shown by Bühlmann and Jewell (1979) that, under mild assumptions, the constraint of financial fairness singles out a unique solution among the set of all Pareto efficient risk exchanges. In this paper, we find that an analogous statement is true if we limit ourselves to linear exchanges. Conditions are provided for existence and uniqueness of linear sharing rules that are both financially fair and Pareto efficient among all linear sharing rules. The performance of the linear rule is compared to that of the general (nonlinear) rule in a number of specific cases.

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  • Schumacher, Johannes M., 2018. "Linear Versus Nonlinear Allocation Rules In Risk Sharing Under Financial Fairness," ASTIN Bulletin, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 995-1024, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:astinb:v:48:y:2018:i:03:p:995-1024_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Denuit, Michel & Robert, Christian Y., 2021. "From risk sharing to pure premium for a large number of heterogeneous losses," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 116-126.
    2. Chen, An & Rach, Manuel, 2023. "Actuarial fairness and social welfare in mixed-cohort tontines," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 214-229.
    3. Nicole Branger & An Chen & Antje Mahayni & Thai Nguyen, 2023. "Optimal collective investment: an analysis of individual welfare," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, volume 17, number 5, June.
    4. An Chen & Thai Nguyen & Manuel Rach, 2021. "A collective investment problem in a stochastic volatility environment: The impact of sharing rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 302(1), pages 85-109, July.
    5. Bernard, C. & De Gennaro Aquino, L. & Vanduffel, S., 2023. "Optimal multivariate financial decision making," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(1), pages 468-483.
    6. Denuit, M. & Robert, C.Y., 2020. "From risk sharing to pure premium for a large number of heterogeneous losses," LIDAM Discussion Papers ISBA 2020015, Université catholique de Louvain, Institute of Statistics, Biostatistics and Actuarial Sciences (ISBA).
    7. Fallou Niakh, 2023. "A fixed point approach for computing actuarially fair Pareto optimal risk-sharing rules," Papers 2303.05421, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    8. Chen, An & Nguyen, Thai & Rach, Manuel, 2021. "Optimal collective investment: The impact of sharing rules, management fees and guarantees," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    9. Hieber, Peter & Lucas, Nathalie, 2020. "Life-Care Tontines," LIDAM Discussion Papers ISBA 2020026, Université catholique de Louvain, Institute of Statistics, Biostatistics and Actuarial Sciences (ISBA).

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