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From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate

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  • Krutz, Glen S.
  • Fleisher, Richard
  • Bond, Jon R.

Abstract

Why, given a strong presumption of success, do some presidential nominations fail? Of 1,464 important nominations from 1965 to 1994, less than 5% failed. Ninety-four percent of failures were rejected or withdrawn before reaching the floor, suggesting that opponents are most effective during prefloor stages. We propose a theoretical framework based on the notion that policy entrepreneurs pursue their goals within the context of a presumption of success. Logit analysis tends to support the theory that entrepreneurs can alter the presumption of success and defeat a nomination if they (1) identify negative information about a nominee to provide a rationale for changing the presumption and (2) expand the conflict through committee hearings and the media. Presidential resources—high public approval and efforts to signal that the nomination is a high priority—increase the chances of confirmation. Contrary to previous research, divided government has no independent effect on the fate of nominations.

Suggested Citation

  • Krutz, Glen S. & Fleisher, Richard & Bond, Jon R., 1998. "From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 871-881, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:04:p:871-881_21
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary E Hollibaugh Jr, 2015. "Vacancies, vetting, and votes: A unified dynamic model of the appointments process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 206-236, April.
    2. Jinhee Jo, 2017. "Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 149-164, January.
    3. James D. King & James W. Riddlesperger Jr., 2015. "Diversity and Presidential Cabinet Appointments," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(1), pages 93-103, March.
    4. Fang-Yi Chiou & Lawrence S Rothenberg, 2014. "Executive appointments: Duration, ideology, and hierarchy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 496-517, July.

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