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Domestic Opposition and Foreign War

Author

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  • Mesquita, Bruce Bueno De
  • Lalman, David

Abstract

Domestic opposition to violent, escalatory national policies during international crises has long been considered an important factor influencing the foreign policy behavior of nations. Yet the explicit theoretical linkages between domestic opposition and crisis choices have not been investigated. To provide these linkages, we set out an extensive form game of sequential decisions leading to the various consequences of crises together with their attendant costs and benefits. Our findings indicate that an antagonist's beliefs about domestic opposition are not particularly effective levers to manipulate in crises when a peaceful resolution is the goal.

Suggested Citation

  • Mesquita, Bruce Bueno De & Lalman, David, 1990. "Domestic Opposition and Foreign War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 747-765, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:03:p:747-765_19
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    Cited by:

    1. Nehemia Geva & James Mayhar & J. Mark Skorick, 2000. "The Cognitive Calculus of Foreign Policy Decision Making," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(4), pages 447-471, August.
    2. Flesch, J. & Kuipers, J. & Schoenmakers, G. & Vrieze, K., 2013. "Subgame-perfection in free transition games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 201-207.
    3. Bruce J. Bueno De Mesquita & Robert W. Jackman & Randolph M. Siverson, 1991. "Introduction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(2), pages 181-186, June.
    4. Michael D. McGinnis, 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(3), pages 443-473, September.
    5. Michael J. Ireland & Scott Sigmund Gartner, 2001. "Time to Fight," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(5), pages 547-568, October.
    6. Eelco van der Maat, 2011. "Sleeping hegemons: Third-party intervention following territorial integrity transgressions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(2), pages 201-215, March.
    7. Spagat, Michael & Mandler, Michael, 2003. "Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them," CEPR Discussion Papers 4004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Keisuke Iida, 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 403-426, September.
    9. Paul K. Huth, 1998. "Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 744-770, December.
    10. Steven B. Redd, 2002. "The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(3), pages 335-364, June.
    11. D. Marc Kilgour, 1991. "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(2), pages 266-284, June.
    12. Diana Richards & T. Clifton Morgan & Rick K. Wilson & Valerie L. Schwebach & Garry D. Young, 1993. "Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 504-535, September.
    13. Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.
    14. Barry O'Neill, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: II," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 459-477, October.
    15. Flesch, J. & Kuipers, J. & Schoenmakers, G. & Vrieze, K., 2011. "Subgame-perfection in free transition games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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