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The Supreme Court and National Policy Making

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  • Casper, Jonathan D.

Abstract

The role of the Supreme Court of the United States in national policy making has long been a subject of debate among students of the American legal system and of democratic theory. Both the relative influence of the Court vis-à -vis other political institutions and the implications of judicial review for principles of majority rule and democracy have been central to this discussion. Perhaps the most influential account of the role of the Court offered in recent years is Robert A. Dahl's 1957 article, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court in National Policy-Making.†Dahl argues that the Court, like other political institutions, is a member of the stable ruling coalitions that dominate American politics, and that its decisions are generally supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions. Consideration of the way Dahl interprets his own evidence, of Court decisions since 1957, and of other relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis (particularly the activities of the Court in statutory construction and in cases arising out of states and localities) suggests that the Court participates more significantly in national policy making than Dahl's argument admits.

Suggested Citation

  • Casper, Jonathan D., 1976. "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 50-63, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:70:y:1976:i:01:p:50-63_26
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    Cited by:

    1. Toma, Eugenia F., 1996. "A contractual model of the voting behavior of the supreme court: The role of the chief justice," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 433-447, December.

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