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Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline

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  • FORTUNATO, DAVID
  • LOFTIS, MATT W.

Abstract

We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that (1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and (2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we show that governments increase spending as their expected duration withers and run higher deficits as they surpass their forecasted life expectancy.

Suggested Citation

  • Fortunato, David & Loftis, Matt W., 2018. "Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 939-953, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:112:y:2018:i:04:p:939-953_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Aizenman, Joshua & Jinjarak, Yothin & Spiegel, Mark M., 2023. "Fiscal capacity and commercial bank lending under COVID-19," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak & Mark M. Spiegel, 2022. "Fiscal Stimulus and Commercial Bank Lending Under COVID-19," Working Paper Series 2022-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    3. Noell Machinjike & Wellington G. Bonga, 2021. "Fiscal Discipline and Budget Processes: Evidence from Zimbabwe," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 5(2), pages 607-616, February.

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