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When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House

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  • MAESTAS, CHERIE D.
  • FULTON, SARAH
  • MAISEL, L. SANDY
  • STONE, WALTER J.

Abstract

The health of any democratic system depends on political ambition to generate a steady supply of quality candidates for office. Because most models of candidate entry assume ambition rather than model it, previous research fails to understand its roots in individual and institutional characteristics. We develop a two-stage model of progressive behavior that distinguishes between the formation of ambition for higher office and the decision to enter a particular race. Using data from a survey of state legislators, we demonstrate that the intrinsic costs and benefits associated with running for and holding higher office shape ambitions but do not influence the decision to run. For progressively ambitious legislators, the second-stage decision is a strategic choice about when to run rather than whether to run. Our research highlights how institutional characteristics that foster progressive ambition also increase the likelihood that national or local political conditions will be translated into meaningful choices at the ballot box.

Suggested Citation

  • Maestas, Cherie D. & Fulton, Sarah & Maisel, L. Sandy & Stone, Walter J., 2006. "When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 195-208, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:02:p:195-208_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Carsey & William Berry, 2014. "What’s a losing party to do? The calculus of contesting state legislative elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 251-273, July.
    2. Kevin Arceneaux & Johanna Dunaway & Martin Johnson & Ryan J. Vander Wielen, 2020. "Strategic Candidate Entry and Congressional Elections in the Era of Fox News," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 398-415, April.
    3. Cherie D. Maestas & Cynthia R. Rugeley, 2008. "Assessing the “Experience Bonus” Through Examining Strategic Entry, Candidate Quality, and Campaign Receipts in U.S. House Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 520-535, July.

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