La revisión judicial de las decisiones regulatorias: una mirada institucionaL

This article argues that the method and length of judicial review depend primarily upon the interaction of two variables. The first one is whether the reviewer is specialised or generalist. The second variable is the scope of the review. If the reviewer is generalist, it will probably have an incentive to be deferent with the Administration. Then, in principle, the scope of the review should only extend to questions of law, because a greater scope of review may result in damage to the objectives of the regulatory system. By contrast, if the reviewer is specialised, incentives to be deferent are scarce. In this case, the scope of the review should not be restricted, in order to not reduce the benefits of specialisation. The authors hold that the institutional system can operate efficiently and with legitimacy only when both variables are fundamentally linked —this is, when the scope of review is designed taking into account the institutional characteristics of the reviewer. This thesis is illustrated with the cases of Chilean competition law and environmental law, two areas where the variables have been mixed defectively.