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Institutional underdevelopment, anarchy, crime and poverty trap of in transition economies

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Author Info
Guillaume CHEIKBOSSfAN ()
Abstract

When eastern countries, at the beginning of the nineties, launched reforms to implement a market economy (price liberalization, privatization etc ... ), economic advisers and policy makers believed that these reforms would create the rule of the law and property rights enforcement. That did not happen. Today, in some transition economies, the rule of the law and market institutions are inefficient or do not exist. This article presents some explanations of this situation. Particularly, it emphasizes coordination problems in law enforcement that can trap the economy in an equilibrium where predatory activities undermine productive activities.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Paris in its journal Cahiers d'économie Politique.

Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 47 ()
Pages: 95-110
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Handle: RePEc:cpo:journl:y:2004:i:47:p:95-110

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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