This paper models a union and firm choosing between long labor contracts, in which wages are predetermined, and short contracts, in which wages are flexible. It is shown that the union strictly prefers short contracts because it dislikes the greater employment volatility in long contracts. In contrast, the convexity of the firm's profit function leads the firm to prefer the greater uncertainty of long contracts. The model predicts that workers are prepared to enter long contracts only if they are compensated with a higher real wage. This prediction is tested using a large sample of Canadian collective agreements, with generally supportive results.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Volume (Year): 28 (1995) Issue (Month): 4b (November) Pages: 1161-79 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Contact details of provider: Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4 Email: Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)