Optimum Discriminatory Tariffs under Oligopolistic Competition
AbstractThis paper attempts to present a simple Cournot model to determine the optimal discriminatory tariff rates, when the international market is a homogeneous (heterogeneous) product market. In the model, there are two foreign firms located in two different countries competing for sales in a local market. When the firms sell a homogeneous product and the home country can impose differential tariffs on imports from different countries, then the tariff on the low-cost producer should be hgher. In particular, with constant marginal costs the tariff difference should equal half the cost difference. On the other hand, if the firms sell differentiated products with symmetric linear demands and technologies, then the weaker the degree of product differentiation, the greater is the tariff difference compared with the cost difference.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 24 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pei-Cheng Liao, 2008. "International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Tariff Policies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 55-70, February.
- Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 1997.
"Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information,"
NBER Working Papers
6090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas J. Prusa & Dobrin Kolev, 1998. "Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 199705, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Saggi, Kamal, 2004. "Tariffs and the most favored nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 341-368, July.
- Beladi, Hamid & Chakrabarti, Avik, 2008. "Foreign equity participation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 279-295, July.
- Tsai Pan-Long, 1999. "Regional Intergration, Foreign Investment, And Optimal Trade And Investment Policies," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18.
- Missios, Paul & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2006. "The role of MFN under asymmetries in environmental standards," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 297-304, November.
- Saggi, Kamal & Sengul, Faruk & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2007. "Sustaining multilateral cooperation among asymmetric countries: Does MFN help?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 543-562.
- Kolev, Dobrin R. & Prusa, Thomas J., 1999. "Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 51-76, October.
- Mehdi M. Chowdhury, . "Migration, Remittances and Competition in International Labour Market," Discussion Papers 09/02, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
- To, Ted, 1998.
"Dynamics and Discriminatory Import Policy,"
CSGR Working papers series
07/98, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
- Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C, 2001.
"Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favoured Nation Clause,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2001. "Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 233-279, June.
- Nigar Hashimzade & Hassan Khodavaisi & Gareth Myles, 2011. "MFN Status and the Choice of Tariff Regime," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 22(5), pages 847-874, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.