Work on pensions has been in progress in Italy since 1992. The Italian pension system, essentially a public Pay-As-You-Go pension system, must face up to a particularly marked ageing of the population. The Dini reform introduced a notional defined contribution system; the Berlusconi, then Prodi reforms pushed back the minimum retirement age. We present a general equilibrium analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the last two reforms and their effect on the viability of the pension system. Our simulations show that their effectiveness will only be temporary and important political decisions are still to be made.
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Article provided by CEPII research center in its journal La Lettre du CEPII.