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Special Administrative Agency as Competition Watchdog

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  • Bernhard Duijm

Abstract

Most politicians and academics recognize the necessity of a government competition policy to actively maintain and promote competition as the primary mechanism of coordination in a market economy. But there is less agreement on the institutional nature of competition policy. This especially applies to the question of whether competition policy should be by sector or for the economy as a whole. Dr. Bernhard Duijm of the economics faculty of the University of Tübingen compares the competition law of several countries and concludes that if numerous agencies decide on competition policy there is the danger that the principles and laws of competition may be differently interpreted and implemented. A competition policy that is consistent for the economy as a whole can only be achieved with strategies that respect the primacy of a general agency and the general law of competition. The existence of national, sectoral agencies of competition in the EU member states could also hinder a decentralization of European competition policy and intensify the "forum shopping" that is already feared between the general competition agencies. Further international implications are also conceivable, for example if private market access barriers for foreign suppliers are created in particular industries and these are tolerated by the agency in charge on the basis of their interests in the domestic industry. The optimum institutional embodiment of competition protection remains a national task, but the international dimension must not be overlooked

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhard Duijm, 2000. "Special Administrative Agency as Competition Watchdog," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 53(12), pages 03-10, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:53:y:2000:i:12:p:03-10
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • P17 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Performance and Prospects

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