Réforme du cadre budgétaire européen : un argument pour l’adoption d’une règle d’or des finances publiques

The European fiscal framework is based on a well-known asymmetry between monetary policy and fiscal policy, the former entrusted to a central bank with a high degree of independence of means and a mandate mainly related to price stability, and the latter constrained by limits on public deficits and debts. This institutional architecture relies on the strategic substitutability between these two economic policies. The Covid-19 crisis has reshuffled the deck by demonstrating the usefulness of unconstrained fiscal policies and the complementary with monetary policy and it has led to a reflection on a possible reform of the European fiscal framework. Among the proposals discussed is the golden rule for public finances, which would foster public investment in Europe in the long term. As a matter of argument or counter-argument to the adoption of such a rule, I study the interactions between public investment and monetary policy. The empirical results tend to show that public investment and monetary policy act as complements rather than substitutes, which would then justify relaxing the constraints on fiscal policies. However, this should require enhanced policy cooperation on the nature of public investment.