IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/repdal/redp_274_0601.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles

Author

Listed:
  • Aymeric Lardon

Abstract

We survey the results on the core of cooperative oligopoly games. The core is an appropriate set-valued solution for this class of games which deals with the stability of collusive agreements among firms. The aim of this article is to propose a typology of oligopolistic markets in order to put into perspective the results on the core. We highlight necessary and/or sufficient conditions (quantity or price competition, market size, cost heterogeneity, transferable technologies, blocking rules, ...) under which a stable collusive agreement exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Aymeric Lardon, 2017. "Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 601-635.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_274_0601
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_274_0601
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2017-4-page-601.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_274_0601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.