Pour une approche holiste du filet de sécurité financière dans l'Union Européenne : quelques arguments
AbstractAs a result of cross-sector and cross-border integration, European financial systems have become more interwoven, both nationally and internationally. More particularly, they have become more complex in terms of risk interdependencies. Financial stability is obviously affected by these financial changes. Based on a critical analysis of the current European prudential framework?s ability to face this new risk profile, we argue in favour of an holistic approach to the financial safety net through the concept of a regulatory regime which is wider than the prevailing set of rules established by regulatory agencies. More precisely, this paper investigates two essential and interdependent aspects of a coherent and global financial safety net in Europe that favours the complementarities between prudential policy in a narrow sense (set of rules established by regulatory agencies, monitoring and supervision), market discipline and bank resolution policy. On one hand, on the basis of the American experience of prompt corrective action policy, we suggest promoting stronger complementarities between public financial regulation and market discipline. On the other hand, we plead for an institutionalisation of insolvency procedures for pan-european financial groups. Indeed, the European situation is characterized by a damaging heterogeneity of national insolvency regimes even though the European Directive on the Reorganization and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions provides a legal framework dealing with the crossborder aspects of European bank insolvency. This Directive undoubtedly represents an important development in the framework of E.U. banking laws but it does not constitute a panacea and does not completely achieve its goals. In particular, it does not eliminate all the conflicts of interest between Member States concerning all the cross border aspects of bank insolvency.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Dalloz in its journal Revue d'économie politique.
Volume (Year): Volume 116 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique.htm
Prudential policy; financial safety net; bank insolvency; market discipline; public financial regulation;
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