Neutralité actuarielle, modification du taux de remplacement et choix de départ à la retraite

Current reforms of retirement provisions in developed countries ? and especially in France ? imply simultaneously a decrease in average replacement rates and large changes in retirement incentives through more actuarially fair provisions. These measures affect labour supply in a complex way. This methodological article focuses on the analysis of the impact of financial incentives on labour supply at ages 55 and more based on reduced forms of the original model proposed by Stock and Wise [1990]. The results are very sensitive to the way incentives are summed up in a single variable, and to the uncertainty linked to the eligibility to early retirement provisions (the rigorous analysis of which would require a model of labour demand by firms). But they show strong evidence that behavioural effects may have a very large amplitude in countries, like France, whose retirement provisions before the reforms strongly deviate from actuarial fairness.