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Règles de droit et inexécution du contrat. L'apport de la théorie économique des contrats au droit comparé

Author

Listed:
  • Éric Brousseau
  • M’hand Fares

Abstract

There are two remedies to the breach of a contract: the damages rule, that is prevailing in the Common Law system, and the specific performance rule, that is dominant in the Civil Law system. Economic justifications have often been given for the first rule, but the second. Using the incomplete contract theory framework, we analyze the conditions of efficiency for the specific performance rule. We show that in case of unilateral investment the specific performance remedy is as efficient as the damages remed. In case of bilateral investment the specific performance rule dominates the damages rule if all the bargaining power is given to one party. Furthermore, our analysis points out how economics enrich comparative legal analysis. Classification JEL: K12, C78

Suggested Citation

  • Éric Brousseau & M’hand Fares, 2002. "Règles de droit et inexécution du contrat. L'apport de la théorie économique des contrats au droit comparé," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(6), pages 823-844.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_126_0823
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    law and economics; incomplete contract; legal remedies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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