Enchères anglaises inversées avec bonus de qualité dans les procédures d'Eprocurement
AbstractThis paper analyzes the properties of the English auction with bidding credits that is used for e-procurement in the case of differenciated goods. Assuming that production costs are increasing with the level of quality and that the score function of the buyer is concave, we characterize the optimal procurement mechanism when the level of quality offered is common knowledge. We show that the English auction with bidding credits implements the optimal mechanism only under specific assumptions. When the private informations on the costs are uniformly distributed, we characterize a modified English auction with bidding credits by capping payments and we prove that this procedure implements the optimal mechanism.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.
Volume (Year): 72 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Michel MOUGEOT & Florence NAEGELEN, 2006. "Enchères anglaises inversées avec bonus de qualité dans les procédures d’E-procurement," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006032, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.