Développement des logiciels dans un duopole asymétrique en présence des spillovers open source

How does the choice to invest in OSS (Open Source Software) of the firm depends upon its market position relative to that of its rival? In this paper, we study how the innovation under OSS regime, i.e. in the presence of open source spillovers is affected by the asymmetry of firms. We focus on effects driven purely by the strategic interactions of firms, and thus do not allow for an aggregate demand effects. Then, we examine the welfare impact of OSS. The main findings are: (i) when the level of asymmetry is sufficiently low, firms under-invest in the quality of their software under OSS regime, (ii) when the level of asymmetry is sufficiently high, the large firm (resp. the small firm) under-invest (resp. overinvests) under OSS regime ; (iii) when both firms are relatively symmetric, their profits increase under OSS regime and their decisions in terms of OSS are strategic complements (iv) when both firms are relatively asymmetric, the profit of the large firm (resp. the small firm) decreases (resp. increases) under OSS regime and their decisions in terms of OSS are strategic substitutes ; (v) Welfare increases with OSS only if both firms are sufficiently symmetric.