Les fonds de pension américains, le gouvernement d'entreprise et la durabilité

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate a certain internal incoherence within the professional fund management industry, and in particular within the American pension funds. Following a discussion of the structure of the industry of pension fund management, and the special role of public pension funds particularly with respect to corporate governance and sustainability issues, a peculiar form of self-deception is demonstrated in the latter: their actions are often not in accordance with stated policies in this area. The author identifies two self-contradictory tendencies which dominate the current debate regarding corporate governance and the responsibility of investors, including the pension funds, for the current crisis. One, short-termism, is integral to the nature of savings and of the professional management of retirement monies for others. Whatever amelioration of this tendency is possible would have to come from outside the industry itself. The other, a prevalence of conflicts of interest particularly focused upon issues of investor involvement in the governance and sustainability of the business models of corporations, is a by-product of the current structure of the industry, and could be ameliorated by internal reforms initiated within the industry itself. Classification JEL: G23, G24, G34.