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Comment le contrôle des chômeurs modifie-t-il le contrat optimal d’assurance chômage ?

Author

Listed:
  • Sébastien Ménard
  • Solenne Tanguy

Abstract

Unemployment insurance is commonly believed to adversely affect job search behavior and to lengthen the duration of unemployment.?Given that job search is difficult to monitor, much literature has focused on the need for decreasing unemployment benefits according to the unemployment duration as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [1997].?In a principal-agent model, we argue that monitoring individual behavior associated with credible penalities in case of insufficient effort can undermine the need for a declining sequence.?In particular, if the monitoring technology is almost perfect, proposing an increasing sequence of unemployment benefits with the unemployment duration is optimal in that it increases the opportunity cost of shirking. Classification JEL : D82, H53, J65, J68.

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien Ménard & Solenne Tanguy, 2018. "Comment le contrôle des chômeurs modifie-t-il le contrat optimal d’assurance chômage ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(5), pages 745-778.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_695_0745
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment insurance; incentives; monitoring; sanctions; public expenditures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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