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On the Optimal Choice of Enforcement Technology. An Efficiency Explanation of Privacy Rights

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  • Nuno Garoupa

Abstract

This paper develops an economic analysis of enforcement technology choice and privacy rights. We provide an efficiency explanation for the European Convention of Human Rights. Our model suggests that an enforcement technology with privacy rights generates more offences (deterrence is diluted) and exhibits a reduced quality of convictions (in terms of false negatives and false positives), but could be welfare enhancing if the individual cost of being investigated is reasonably high. We also show that the choice of enforcement technology is related to the level of harm caused by crime, and it is likely that an enforcement technology with privacy rights will be welfare diminishing for extremely harmful crimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Nuno Garoupa, 2007. "On the Optimal Choice of Enforcement Technology. An Efficiency Explanation of Privacy Rights," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(6), pages 1353-1362.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_586_1353
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    Cited by:

    1. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2018. "On the role of the exclusionary rule for optimal law enforcement effort," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 757-767, October.

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