Propriété industrielle et choix de localisation. Une modélisation théorique
AbstractThis article considers a location choice between two identical countries differentiated only by the protection they provide to corporate owners of intellectual property rights. It is shown that when foreign direct investment deters entry by local imitators, the multinational firms settles into the low-protection country if the markets under consideration are sufficiently large relative to the export costs between these two countries.Classification JEL : F23, K0, O34
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 54 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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