Le processus global d'audit : source de développement d'une gouvernance cognitive ?

This paper argues that strong interactions between the three players in the global audit process could lead to higher quality information for company directors. This information could then contribute to improved decision-making and enable the company to seize the most relevant investment opportunities. However, the audit process can contribute to such cognitive governance only by relying on a formalized system of relations between the audit committee, internal auditors and external auditors. In order to identify such an interaction model, we led an empirical investigation based on the Delphi technique by building a group of French experts equally composed of all players in the global audit process. Our research shows that audit committees do not fully take on the role of coordinator and facilitator that they should have in the audit process. Furthermore, the relationships between internal auditors and external auditors can be described as non-systematic interactions rather than actual cooperation. Using dynamic collective action theory (Hatchuel 1994) to explain this low intensity of interactions, we conclude that the conditions to produce useful collective information are not met in the French context, and that the current system of relations actually hinders any changes in the interaction model. Incorporating the 8th European Directive into French law could improve these relations, because it aims at endowing the audit committee with added institutional power and legitimacy. Nevertheless, several issues about dysfunctional collective action remain unsolved.