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Copyright Infringement, Product Quality and Producer's Profit

Author

Listed:
  • Banerjee Dyuti

    (Department of Economics, Monash University, Australia)

  • Mukherjee Vivekananda

    (Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, India)

Abstract

This paper uses a strategic entry-deterrence framework to study the relationship between copying cost, and a monopolist's profit and product quality. The potential entrant is a fake-producer producing and selling identical copies of the monopolist's product. The monopolist's subgame perfect equilibrium quality and profit is either unaffected or positively affected by changes in the copying cost. Tariffs on copying devices may be an effective copyright right protection instrument. Though an increase in tariff increases the product quality and monopolist's profit, its welfare effects are ambiguous.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee Dyuti & Mukherjee Vivekananda, 2007. "Copyright Infringement, Product Quality and Producer's Profit," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(3), pages 793-816, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:3:y:2007:i:3:n:8
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1159
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    Cited by:

    1. Mustonen, Mikko, 2019. "Direct publishing and the bargaining between the author and the publisher," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 40-47.

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