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The Equilibrium of Parking Violation and China’s Economic Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Hong Sheng

    (Shandong University, Jinan, China)

Abstract

Political decision makers are economic agents who try to maximize self-interests. This simple assumption helps explain China’s decision-making of reform and opening up and shed light on its contradictory political logic. Under a fully planned economy, market liberalization benefits everyone, including political decision makers. After wealth is created in the market economy, political decision-makers have incentives to take a growing share of wealth for themselves if no institutional mechanism exists to check their power. When the proportion of wealth appropriated by political decision-makers exceeds the margin where the people can afford, the market starts to suffer and the growth of wealth is derailed. At the extreme, political decision-makers takes so much wealth to push the entire social economic system to the verge of collapse. Because political decision-makers do not know where the equilibrium margin is, the above thinking has practical consequences. When political decision-makers keep expanding their take of wealth, the worst scenario may occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Hong Sheng, 2019. "The Equilibrium of Parking Violation and China’s Economic Reform," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-13, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:maneco:v:6:y:2019:i:1:p:13:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/me-2019-0002
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