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Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan

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  • Ausubel Lawrence M
  • Cramton Peter

Abstract

The details of the auction design could make or break the Treasury's plan to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions to determine prices, according to Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The Economists' Voice.

Volume (Year): 5 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1-3

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:5:y:2008:i:5:n:5

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Cited by:
  1. Hillinger, Claude, 2008. "How to deal with the US financial crisis at no cost to the taxpayer," Discussion Papers in Economics 6929, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008. "A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 08tara, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.

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