Rat Races and Glass Ceilings
AbstractIn an ongoing organization, such as a large law partnership firm, employees are motivated not only by current rewards but also by the prospect of promotion, and the opportunity to make the rules in the future. This leads to a recursive contract design problem in an overlapping generations environment, where current agents may become future principals. The principal offers, and promotion-motivated agents accept, harsh rat race contracts with low wages and high effort levels. Hiring and promotion probabilities emerge as the preferred instrument to screen high cost workers, who face employment barriers and a glass ceiling.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
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"Risk-Taking and Gender in Hierarchies,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
qt3470h635, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2006. "Risk Taking and Gender in Hierarchies," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2tm5m16f, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2009. "Risk Taking and Gender in Hierarchies," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9gn734nz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 2008. "Risk Taking and Gender in Hierarchies," NBER Working Papers 14464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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