Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games
AbstractWe study long run implications of reinforcement learning when two players repeatedly interact with one another over multiple rounds to play a finite action game. Within each round, the players play the game many successive times with a fixed set of aspirations used to evaluate payoff experiences as successes or failures. The probability weight on successful actions is increased, while failures result in players trying alternative actions in subsequent rounds. The learning rule is supplemented by small amounts of inertia and random perturbations to the states of players. Aspirations are adjusted across successive rounds on the basis of the discrepancy between the average payoff and aspirations in the most recently concluded round. We define and characterize pure steady states of this model, and establish convergence to these under appropriate conditions. Pure steady states are shown to be individually rational, and are either Pareto-efficient or a protected Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Conversely, any Pareto-efficient and strictly individually rational action pair, or any strict protected Nash equilibrium, constitutes a pure steady state, to which the process converges from non-negligible sets of initial aspirations. Applications to games of coordination, cooperation, oligopoly, and electoral competition are discussed.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Jianying Qiu, 2006.
"Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2006-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Gueth, Werner & Levati, M. Vittoria & Qiu, Jianying, 2007. "Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner G?th & M. Vittoria Levati & Jianying Qiu, 2009. "Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence," Working Papers 2009-14, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Gotts, Nicholas M. & Polhill, J. Gary, 2007. "Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 259-276, November.
- Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2012. "Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: An evolutionary approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 433-454.
- Dziubinski, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2007.
"Endogenous selection of aspiring and rational rules in coordination games,"
5941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marcin Dziubinski & Jaideep Roy, 2007. "Endogenous Selection of Aspiring and Rational rules in Coordination Games," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 07-14, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
- Martorana, Marco Ferdinando & Mazza, Isidoro, 2010.
"Satisfaction and adaptation in voting behavior: an empirical exploration,"
29135, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2011.
- Martorana, Marco & Mazza, Isidoro, 2010. "Satisfaction and adaptation in voting behavior: an empirical exploration," DEMQ Working Paper Series 2010/6, University of Catania, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods.
- John Duffy, 2004.
"Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments,"
- Dean P Foster & Peyton Young, 2006. "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000676, David K. Levine.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.