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Herding with Costly Observation

Author

Listed:
  • Kultti Klaus K

    (Department of Economics, University of Helsinki)

  • Miettinen Paavo A

    (Bank of Finland and Department of Economics, University of Helsinki)

Abstract

We characterize optimal strategies in a simple herding model where observations have a small cost. We assume that there are two states and two possible signals that each agent may get. The prior distribution is biased towards adopting behavior. That is, ex-ante, adopting gives a higher expected utility than not adopting. Contrary to Kultti & Miettinen (2005) herding does not arise deterministically in this model when the cost of observation is small.

Suggested Citation

  • Kultti Klaus K & Miettinen Paavo A, 2007. "Herding with Costly Observation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:28
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1320
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Wan-Ru, 2011. "Herding with costly information and signal extraction," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 624-632, October.
    2. Marlats, Chantal & Ménager, Lucie, 2021. "Strategic observation with exponential bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    3. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Omer Tamuz & Ivo Welch, 2021. "Information Cascades and Social Learning," Papers 2105.11044, arXiv.org.
    4. Yoon, Young-Ro, 2015. "Strategic behavior in acquiring and revealing costly private information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 133-148.
    5. Song, Yangbo, 2016. "Social learning with endogenous observation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 324-333.
    6. Diefeng Peng & Yulei Rao & Xianming Sun & Erte Xiao, 2019. "Optional Disclosure and Observational Learning," Monash Economics Working Papers 05-18, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Mats Godenhielm & Klaus Kultti, 2008. "In a Herd? Herding with costly observation and an unknown number of predecessors," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 95-103, Autumn.

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