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Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India

Author

Listed:
  • Banerji A.

    (Delhi School of Economics)

  • Meenakshi J.V.

    (lnternational Food Policy Research Institute)

Abstract

This paper undertakes structural estimation of asymmetric auction models in a market for basmati, and detects the presence of a cartel consisting of a large (in market share) local miller and commission agents purchasing for large distant millers. The contracts between the distant millers and their commission agents help to explain the specific form that collusion takes. Simulations indicate that (i) the cartel gains considerably by colluding, over the competitive outcome; (ii) however, sellers (farmers) do not lose significantly under collusion when the commission agents bid. The paper also shows that efficient collusion, the form of collusion commonly assumed in the literature, does not explain the data well.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerji A. & Meenakshi J.V., 2008. "Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-27, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:4
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1786
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    Cited by:

    1. Bart Minten & Anneleen Vandeplas & Johan Swinnen, 2011. "Regulations, Brokers, and Interlinkages: The Institutional Organization of Wholesale Markets in India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(7), pages 864-886, May.

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