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Crowdfunding – the Interplay between Evolving Organization and Embedding Institutions

Author

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  • Lissowska Maria

    (Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium)

Abstract

This paper explains the functioning of economic crowdfunding (equity- and loan-based). One of the angles from which crowdfunding can be analysed is institutional economics. Namely, it can be studied as a case where the spontaneous evolution of contractual forms is difficult and the need for legislative intervention arises. The paper explains the divergence of interests and risks of three groups of agents involved (platforms, fundraisers and funders). The radical asymmetry of power, to the advantage of the platform, is inherent in this type of business.

Suggested Citation

  • Lissowska Maria, 2021. "Crowdfunding – the Interplay between Evolving Organization and Embedding Institutions," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-20, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:11:y:2021:i:3:p:20:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/ael-2017-0032
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crowdfunding; two-sided markets; asymmetry of information; institutional arrangements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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