Three issues in the political economy of protection are examined. The first, the endogenization of interest group formation, is addressed from the perspective of profitability instead of the difficulty caused by the free-rider problem. The second issue is the determinants of an interest group's political influence. Two sets of determinants--the characteristics of the interest group and the political economic environment faced by that group--are identified. The third is the circumstances under which the presence of more interest groups is socially preferable to fewer. Such circumstances are related to the parameters of the model. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 6 (1998) Issue (Month): 3 (August) Pages: 472-87 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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