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Strategic communication in committees with expressive payoffs

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  • Yves Breitmoser
  • Justin Valasek

Abstract

This article explores information aggregation and strategic communication in settings where committee members are held accountable, formally or informally, for their individual voting decisions. We show that if decisions are made via majority voting, expressive payoffs introduce a free‐rider problem that prevents the committee from communicating truthfully and taking optimal decisions. In contrast, if decisions are made by unanimity, free‐riding is mitigated because all agents are responsible for the committee's decision. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that under unanimity subjects are more truthful and are ultimately more likely to take the optimal decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Breitmoser & Justin Valasek, 2024. "Strategic communication in committees with expressive payoffs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(1), pages 33-54, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:55:y:2024:i:1:p:33-54
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12457
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