Delegating management to experts
AbstractOwners of property and assets frequently delegate decisions about operating and maintaining their property to managers who are better informed about local market conditions. We analyze how owners optimally contract with managers who vary in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the most expert managers offer the greatest variation in operating recommendations. Owners benefit from dealing with experts provided they contract sequentially, whereby terms are negotiated gradually as the manager acquires information.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Szalay, Dezsö, 2009.
"Contracts with endogenous information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 586-625, March.
- Dezso Szalay, 2006. "Contracts with Endogenous Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 780, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dezsö SZALAY, 2004. "Contracts with Endogenous Information," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 04.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2011.
"The Benefits of Sequential Screening,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
363, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011.
"Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process,"
2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
- Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2012.
"Informing consumers about their own preferences,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 417-428.
- Goodall, Amanda H. & Kahn, Lawrence M. & Oswald, Andrew J., 2011. "Why do leaders matter? A study of expert knowledge in a superstar setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 265-284, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.