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Impulse Balance and Multiple-Period Feedback in the Newsvendor Game

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  • Axel Ockenfels
  • Reinhard Selten

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="poms12399-abs-0001"> Human subjects in the newsvendor game place suboptimal orders: orders are typically between the expected profit-maximizing quantity and mean demand (“pull-to-center bias”). In previous work, we have shown that impulse balance equilibrium (IBE), which is based on a simple ex post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition, can predict ordering decisions in the laboratory. In this study, we extend IBE to standing orders and multiple-period feedback and show that it predicts—in line with previous findings—that constraining newsvendors to make a standing order for a sequence of periods moves the average of submitted orders toward the optimum.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2015. "Impulse Balance and Multiple-Period Feedback in the Newsvendor Game," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(12), pages 1901-1906, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:popmgt:v:24:y:2015:i:12:p:1901-1906
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/poms.2015.24.issue-12
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    Cited by:

    1. Anna‐Lena Sachs & Michael Becker‐Peth & Stefan Minner & Ulrich W. Thonemann, 2022. "Empirical newsvendor biases: Are target service levels achieved effectively and efficiently?," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(4), pages 1839-1855, April.
    2. Felix T. S. Chan & Xinsheng Xu, 2019. "The Loss-Averse Retailer’s Order Decisions Under Risk Management," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(7), pages 1-16, July.
    3. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova, 2017. "Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1163-1191, November.
    4. Samuel N. Kirshner & Zhaolin Li, 2022. "Supply chain contracting with competing regretful retailers," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2196-2211, September.

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