This paper adds to the literature on finding empirical measures for macroeconomic game-theoretic concepts. Building on the work by A. A. Weber, the authors measure antiinflation reputation by looking at the pricing of inflation in bond markets. Their model distinguishes between the effects of the 'home' inflation and 'worldwide' inflation on bond returns. In this way, the authors are able to identify countries where central bankers accommodate swings in worldwide inflation but resist domestic inflation pressures. They introduce the term 'relative antiinflation reputation' for such central bankers. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Volume (Year): 64 (1996) Issue (Month): 0 (Suppl.) Pages: 66-82 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:manch2:v:64:y:1996:i:0:p:66-82
Contact details of provider:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).