Tax Evasion and Moral Constraints: Some Experimental Evidence
AbstractTax evasion has been mainly studied as a problem of choice under uncertainty; like any portfolio manager, the taxpayer has to allocate his/her fixed gross income between two assets: a risky asset, tax evasion, and a safe asset, tax payment. This approach, however, does not take full account of the moral constraints involved in the tax evasion decision. The main objective of the experiment presented in the paper was to investigate the role played by moral constraints in the tax evasion decision. The evidence suggests that the taxpayer's decisional process involves not only monetary elements but also psychological and moral factors. Copyright 1997 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 50 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
Other versions of this item:
- Luigi Bosco & Luigi Mittone, 1994. "Tax evasion and moral constraints: some experimental evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 9402, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
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