Coordination, Altruism and Under-development
AbstractThis article presents a consequentialist analysis of the impact of overlapping redistributive obligations on the process of economic development. In using the rotten kid theorem, it takes into account the existence of a distributive norm internalized by specific individuals, whose behavior induces reciprocal strategic altruism. A comparison between families and communities is introduced in order to explore the consequences of an extended altruistic interaction with particular attention devoted to developing countries. The conclusion is that, under specific conditions, strategic altruism can be considered as a microeconomic foundation of underdevelopment. Copyright 1995 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 48 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
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