AbstractMost regulations of insider trading rely at least to some extent on fairness considerations. The most prominent legal underpinnings of insider trading legislation are the rule of equality among shareholders, the equal access to information rule and the concept of fiduciary duty. The present paper discusses the main economic arguments concerning insider trading and contrasts them with the different versions of the fairness argument. Three main arguments are analyzed. Does the anticipation of insider trading on secondary markets lead to the breakdown of financial markets? Do the benefits of more informative prices outweigh the costs of information acquisition Does the possibility of insider trading create the right or the wrong incentives for corporate insiders? Copyright 1991 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 44 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
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- Hellwig, Martin, 2006.
"Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
155, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Martin Hellwig, 2005. "Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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