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The Pope and the Price of Meat: A Public Choice Perspective

Author

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  • RICHARD W. AULT
  • ROBERT B. EKELUND
  • ROBERT D. TOLLISON

Abstract

Modern economics has expanded beyond treating economic institutions as exogenous. This paper applies public choice and modern regulatory theory to the twentiethcentury Roman Catholic Church and attempts to discover why the decision was made in 1966 to absolve Catholics from the requirement that meat not be eaten on most Fridays of the year. We provide a cartel analysis of the institutional backdrop and power structure of the College of Cardinals within the Church. In this framework, self‐interest, the geographic production of beef and fish, and the expanded number of voters in the College of Cardinals are the keys to understanding why Pope PAUL VI decided to change the relative price of meat and to alter penance rules in 1966. In der modernen Ökonomie werden wirtschaftliche Institutionen nicht mehr als exogen betrachtet. Im Artikel wird mit Hilfe der politischen Ökonomie und der modernen Regulierungstheorie aufzuzeigen versucht, warum die Römisch Katholische Kirche 1966 den Entscheid fällte, Katholiken von der Verpflichtung zu entbinden, an den meisten Freitagen im Jahr kein Fleisch zu essen. Eine Kartellanalyse des institutionellen Hintergrundes und der Machtstruktur im Kardinalskollegium lässt den Eigennutz, die geographische Verteilung der Produktion von Rindfleisch und Fisch sowie die Zunahme der Stimmberechtigten im Kardinalskollegium als Gründe für die von Papst PAUL VI. 1966 beschlossene Veränderung der Bussregeln (welche nicht ohne Einfluss auf die relativen Fleischpreise blieb) erscheinen. Les sciences économiques d'aujourd'hui ne considèrent plus que les institutions sont exogènes. Dans l'article, on applique la théorie de la régulation et du choix public à l'église catholique du vingtième siècle afin de découvrir les raisons pour lesquelles la décision a été prise en 1966 de ne plus obliger les catholiques pratiquants de faire maigre le vendredi. On présente une analyse du pouvoir de l'institution du Sacré Collège comme cartel. Dans ce contexte, on propose que l'intérêt individuel, la production géographique du bauf et du poisson et l'augmentation du nombre d'électeurs dans le Sacré Collége sont les éléments essentiels qui expliquent la décision du pape PAUL VI de modifier, en 1966, les règles de pénitence et (par la suite) le changement du prix relatif de la viande.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard W. Ault & Robert B. Ekelund & Robert D. Tollison, 1987. "The Pope and the Price of Meat: A Public Choice Perspective," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 399-413, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:40:y:1987:i:3:p:399-413
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00688.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Ekelund & Robert Hébert, 2010. "Interest groups, public choice and the economics of religion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 429-436, March.
    2. Pavol Minárik, 2013. "Ekonomie náboženství a její relevance pro ekonomy ve střední Evropě [Economics of Religion and its Relevance for Economists in Central Europe]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(5), pages 691-704.
    3. Maxime Menuet, 2017. "Consensus-building in Electoral Competitions: Evidence from Papal Elections," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(4), pages 2826-2834.
    4. Pavol Minarik, 2018. "An economic model of religious organization under oppressive regulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 289-302, July.

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