Optimal Loss Mitigation and Contract Design
AbstractThis work examines the interaction between the premium rates set by an insurer and the incentives of an individual to purchase market insurance and undertake mitigation to reduce the size of a potential loss. A risk-neutral monopolistic insurer prices insurance according to the price-elasticity of demand for coverage. The elasticity of demand is affected by the presence of both mitigation and government intervention. The availability of loss reduction activities increases the consumer's elasticity of demand and lowers the optimal rate charged by the monopolist. Government intervention reduces both expenditures on mitigation and the rate charged by the monopolistic insurer. Copyright 2003 The Journal of Risk and Insurance.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The American Risk and Insurance Association in its journal Journal of Risk & Insurance.
Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Marielle Brunette & Laure Cabantous & Stéphane Couture & Anne Stenger, 2013. "The impact of governmental assistance on insurance demand under ambiguity: a theoretical model and an experimental test," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 153-174, August.
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