IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v18y2016i4p642-665.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Competing for Attention: Lobbying Time-Constrained Politicians

Author

Listed:
  • CHRISTOPHER COTTON

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Cotton, 2016. "Competing for Attention: Lobbying Time-Constrained Politicians," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(4), pages 642-665, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:18:y:2016:i:4:p:642-665
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jpet.2016.18.issue-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Brittany Feor & Blair Long & Eric Richert, 2018. "Who Uses Commercial Lobbying Firms," Working Paper 1409, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    2. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    3. McLeod, Alex, 2021. "Discovery, disclosure, and confidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    4. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    5. Rocco d`Este & Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2020. "Shadow Lobbyists," Working Papers Series inetwp139, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    6. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018. "Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
    7. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:18:y:2016:i:4:p:642-665. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.