Long Term Incentive Plans, Executive Pay and UK Company Performance
AbstractIn agency theory, the remuneration packages of executive directors in large companies are seen as an attempt to give them a pattern of rewards that aligns their interests more closely with shareholders as a whole. The sensitivity of total executive rewards to share price performance has become the conventional yardstick for judgements concerning whether reward packages do indeed serve shareholders' interests or executives themselves. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Management Studies.
Volume (Year): 40 (2003)
Issue (Month): 7 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2380
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- Yoshikawa, Toru & Rasheed, Abdul A. & Del Brio, Esther B., 2010. "The impact of firm strategy and foreign ownership on executive bonus compensation in Japanese firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(11), pages 1254-1260, November.
- Alexander Pepper & Julie Gore, 2013. "The economic psychology of incentives: an international study of top managers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51655, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Janto Haman & Hristos Doucouliagos & Michael Graham, 2012. "Agency Problem II and Convergence in CEO Pay," Economics Series 2012_5, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
- Peter Hahn & Meziane Lasfer, 2011. "The compensation of non-executive directors: rationale, form, and findings," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 589-601, November.
- Duffhues, Pieter & Kabir, Rezaul, 2008. "Is the pay-performance relationship always positive: Evidence from the Netherlands," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 45-60, February.
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