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Vertical Separation and Horizontal Mergers

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  • Ziss, Steffen

Abstract

The author considers a duopoly setting consisting of two manufacturer-retailer pairs in which the observable contract between each manufacturer-retailer pair specifies a two-part tariff. Without intraband competition, the author shows that an upstream merger is anticompetitive under very general demand and cost conditions. Downstream merger is analyzed using linear demand and constant marginal cost and is shown not to be anticompetitive both with and without intraband competition and for both price and output competition between retailers in the premerger regime. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 43 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 63-75

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:43:y:1995:i:1:p:63-75

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Olsen, Trond E. & Straume, Odd Rune, 2006. "Cross border mergers and strategic trade policy with two-part taxation: is international policy coordination beneficial?," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-24, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  2. Jingang Zhao, 1998. "Non-Empty Core as a Precondition for Horizontal Merger: Core Existence without Using Balancedness," Working Papers 98-07, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Karmarkar, Uday S. & Rajaram, Kumar, 2012. "Aggregate production planning for process industries under oligopolistic competition," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(3), pages 680-689.
  4. George Symeonidis, 2008. "Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 247-270, 03.
  5. Manasakis, Constantine & Vlassis, Minas, 2014. "Downstream mode of competition with upstream market power," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 84-93.
  6. George Symeonidis, 2009. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Papers 671, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  7. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2007. "Upstream horizontal mergers, vertical contracts, and bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 963-987, October.
  8. Manasakis, Constantine & Vlassis, Minas, 2013. "Downstream mode of competition with upstream market power," DICE Discussion Papers 118, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  9. Kerem Cakirer, 2007. "A Fixed Effect Model of Endogenous Integration Decision and Its Competitive Effects," Working Papers 2007-18, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  10. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2009. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers and Efficiency Gains," CESifo Working Paper Series 2748, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Xiangkang Yin, 2000. "Two-part tariff competition in duopoly," Working Papers 2000.11, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  12. Constantine Manasakis & Dusanee Kesavayuth & Vasileios Zikos, 2012. "Upstream R&D networks," Working Papers 1201, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  13. Nepelski, Daniel, 2009. "Value chain structure and �exible production technologies," MPRA Paper 26236, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Olsen, Trond E. & Straume, Odd Rune, 2005. "Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?," Working Papers in Economics 13/05, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  15. Dobson, Paul W. & Waterson, Michael, 2007. "The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 935-962, October.
  16. Noriaki Matsushima & Tomomichi Mizuno, 2010. "How do market structures affect decisions on vertical integration/separation?," ISER Discussion Paper 0770, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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